The OpenPGP SmartCard is a card (not unlike the EMV/Chip-n-PIN cards in the UK) for storing private keys. It provides cryptographic functions (signing, encryption and decryption) on board the card.
An OpenPGP SmartCard from Kernel Concepts costs 13.90EUR, and a card reader with integrated PIN pad is 50.00EUR, for a total cost of 63.90EUR. This is significantly pricier than a YubiKey.
Computer, assumed to be Linux, but binaries probably (?) exist for other operating systems. Not to mention the driver for the card reader.
All of the functionality of the card can easily be replicated in software, and it effectively is done so widely.
- GnuPG/PGP private key storage & usage
- SSH private Key storage & usage
Since all cryptographic functions are carried out on the card, as opposed to the machine, the private key is never on a host system, allowing for significantly more secure PGP and SSH private keys.
Given co-operation of browser vendors and service implementers, the OpenPGP SmartCard could reasonably be used in a challenge/response protocol not unlike that implemented by SSH to verify an authentication request for a user.
For this section, we assume a challenge/response protocol has been designed for the card, not unlike that used in SSH.
If authentication server has been compromised, then no keys need to be revoked -- the authentication server only holds the public keys for each of the users. At worst, it could grant access to attackers and deny it to legitimate users.
If the implementation of RSA on the cards is not sufficiently hardened against timing attacks, then the server could mount a timing attack to discover the signing key stored on the card, given enough authentication attempts. Newer implementations of RSA are not vulnerable to this, by blind-signing a challenge-token the timing attack is defeated.
If the card can be stolen and disassembled, then the private key can be recovered, assuming it is stored unencrypted on the card. If the key is stored encrypted on the card (e.g. using the user's PIN) then the key cannot be recovered, assuming that the algorithm used to encrypt the key does not have any cryptographic breaks, or the user's pin remains secure.
Since cryptographic functions are supplied on-card, it should be relatively easy to strongly verify that the server requesting authentication is valid, thus eliminating many man-in-the-middle attacks.
If the function used to generate the private keys is not sufficiently random, then the private keys of a given user could be guessed by an attacker.
I'm open to suggestions. The only real problem with this system vs. the YubiKey system is that the implementation is more often an exercise left to the reader.
An organisation with sufficient funds could use OpenPGP SmartCards to provide security in excess of that provided by a YubiKey, and long-term costs could potentially be lower, as a compromised authentication server does not mandate the re-issuing/re-burning of all cards.
However, it would be a significant investment for an organisation to deploy OpenPGP SmartCards, despite the additional security and functionality.